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21. INTRODUCTION
New types of disclosure and reporting are argued to be 
vital in order to convey a transparent picture of the true 
state of the company. However, they are unfortunately 
not without problems as these types of information 
are somewhat more complex than the information 
provided in the traditional financial statement. Plum-
lee (2003) finds for instance that such information 
imposes significant costs on even expert users such as 
analysts and fund managers and reduces their use of 
it. Analysts’ ability to incorporate complex information 
in their analyses is a decreasing function of its com-
plexity, because the costs of processing and analyzing 
it exceed the benefits indicating bounded rationality. 
Hutton (2002) concludes that the analyst commu-
nity’s inability to raise important questions on quality 
of management and the viability of its business model 
inevitably led to the Enron debacle. 
There seems to be evidence of the fact that all types 
of corporate stakeholders from management to 
employees, owners, the media and politicians have 
grave difficulties in interpreting new forms of report-
ing. One hypothesis could be that if managements’ 
own understanding of value creation is disclosed to 
the other stakeholders in a form that corresponds to 
the stakeholders understanding, then disclosure and 
interpretation of key performance indicators will also 
be facilitated.
If firms report key performance indicators singular-
ly i.e. out of context, or similar information without 
disclosing the business model that explains the 
interconnectedness of the indicators and why the 
bundle of indicators is relevant for understanding 
precisely the strategy for value creation in the specific 
firm, this interpretation must be done by the analysts. 
Currently, there exists limited insight into how this 
interpretation is conducted. 
Hägglund (2001), studied the conceptualization of 
investment objects, and found that capital market 
agents’ predictions of a company’s operations are 
made in three steps. 
1. They create a detailed description of the present 
situation
2. Short horizons are applied in order to reduce risk in 
the predictions
3. They construct scenarios that make it possible to 
categorize new events as they happen 
It is a general conclusion that an understanding of the 
value creation in a firm would be better facilitated if 
companies disclosed their value drivers as an integral 
part of strategy disclosure. Further, this communica-
tion would be even more effective if the framework 
for disclosure was based on a common understanding 
of the value drivers in the company. Several authors 
suggest that business models can enable the creation 
of a comprehensive and more correct set of non-finan-
cial value drivers of the company, thereby constituting 
a useful reference model for disclosure.
From an accounting point of view, improved disclosure 
is more or less about determining the types of informa-
tion that most significantly explains market value, in 
order that these numbers can be disclosed and fed into 
the decision making process, maybe even capitalized, 
but at least used for benchmarking purposes. 
It is, however, questionable whether this would 
improve anything. The analysts and professional 
investors already have deep insight into a lot of details, 
and the most important information is likely to be 
related to the specific strategies of the firms and hence 
difficult to compare and interpret unless it is disclosed 
as an integral part of a framework that explains how 
value is created. 
Since understanding value configurations and cus-
tomer value creation is more of interest from a strat-
egy point of view, a possible reconciliation of the 
reporting-understanding gap could for the firm be 
to disclose its business model, i.e. the story that 
explains how the enterprise works, who the customer 
is, what the customer values – and based on this – how 
the firm is supposed to make money. Exactly how this 
disclosure should be reported is not easy to say, but 
it is one of the issues that will be addressed in later 
phases of this research project.
In the section above, it is evident that a business 
model potentially consists of the interaction be-
tween many different parameters of the organization. 
3Some unique business models thus involve extremely 
complex interdependencies, whereas, in other cases, 
it can be extremely simple to understand the specifics 
of a business model. An example of a company where 
a complex set of interdependencies create a unique 
business model is the Danish medico-technology 
company, Coloplast. 
For Coloplast the platform for a long-term sustainable 
business rests on the interaction between the ability 
to integrate the ideas and requests of the decision-
making nurse-groups into product development with-
out renouncing the product quality perceptions of end-
users. Measuring the performance and development 
of these interdependencies is extremely complex. An 
example of a business model easy to understand is that 
of Ryanair: “a ticket includes no service whatsoever. If 
you require any extras or have physical handicaps, then 
remember your credit card”. 
The notion put forth here is that if it is difficult for the 
company to conceptualize the business model, then 
it may be even more difficult for external parties to 
analyse and understand it. At present there exists 
basically no literature on the aspects of analyzing 
business models. However, several management and 
performance measurement models can be mobilized to 
some extent in the understanding of business model 
performance. Below, four perspectives of analysis are 
identified, each with differing ambitions and therefore 
also with different theoretical underpinnings, namely: 
processes, causality, quality and competences. 
It is widely accepted that intellectual capital, strategy 
and other drivers of value creation constitute strate-
gically important elements for the future profitability 
and survival of companies. Many firms already disclose 
much supplementary information in their management 
commentary regarding strategy, market competition, 
technological developments and products in the pipe-
line. Also, in the Nordic countries and more recently in 
a number of other European countries, companies have 
been experimenting with disclosing such voluntary and 
forward-looking disclosures through intellectual capi-
tal statements. 
The problem - as well as the prospect - with strategy 
is that it is about being different. Hence, the bundle 
of indicators on strategy, intellectual capital etc. that 
will be relevant to disclose will differ among firms. For 
such information to make any sense at all, it should be 
communicated in the strategic context of the firm as 
this would show its relevance in relation to the value 
creation process in the company. In other words, it 
does not make sense to insert such information into a 
standardized accounting regime.
The SSA framework applies a risk-based perspective on 
value creation and combines the analysis of strategic 
and business related processes with risks and risk-con-
trols to the identification of key performance indica-
tors (KPI’s). Thus, the process analysis template of the 
SSA framework helps the analyst to conceive how the 
underlying aspects of performance are related to each 
other via a risk-based approach. 
The Balanced Scorecard’s strategy map analysis is 
another methodology that helps to integrate KPI’s 
and illustrates their interconnectedness. The Balanced 
Scorecard takes its point of departure in a cause- 
and-effect approach on competitive strategy. The 
strategy map methodology helps the analyst to 
link KPI’s through the four perspectives of the Bal-
anced Scorecard. The Business Excellence model is a 
quality-based perspective to identifying KPI’s. Unlike 
the Balanced Scorecard, the Business Excellence model 
does not assume causal links, but rather a milder form 
of relatedness between measures. 
In the section below, a fourth model for the analysis 
of performance measures is applied. It is a model 
developed for the analysis of the intellectual capital 
value proposition by Mouritsen et al. (2003b). In its 
original presentation, the model was proposed to help 
create a set of rules for the analysis of intellectual 
capital statements that allowed the reader to 
appreciate the content of an intellectual statement in 
such a way that he or she could make an independent 
judgment of it. Later, it has been proven applicable to 
the analysis of many types of strategy-related disclo-
sures, including voluntary CSR-reports, IPO prospec-
tuses as well as the management review sections of 
traditional financial reports. 
42. THE ANALYTICAL GUIDELINE
The idea of the analytical guideline was to develop 
analytical rules for voluntary information which 
paralleled the analytical concerns of the financial 
statement. According to Bukh et al. (2005) insight 
into financial assets could be translated to insight 
into the constellation of knowledge and value creation 
resources; insight about investments could be 
translated into insight about upgrading competences 
and resources; and finally, insight into performance 
could be translated into insight about the effects of 
knowledge, innovation and strategic choices.
The information ‘input’ for the analytical model can be 
derived from the information channels of the company 
which is to be analyzed; e.g. from the annual report, 
corporate website, management interviews or reports 
of financial analysts. In the case where an annual 
report is the supplier of information, the input thus 
becomes the specific indicators representing value 
creation, management challenges and the activities 
that the company performs. 
The indicators are disentangled from the text of 
the annual report through the analytical model that 
organises the indicators according to three gen-
eral problematisations of the firm (similar to the 
problematisations of the financial statement): What 
is the composition of value creation resources (what 
is the composition of assets)? What are the activities 
made to upgrade competences and resources (which 
investments are made in the firm)? What are the 
effects of knowledge, innovation and strategic choices 
(what is profitability)? These questions are concerned 
with the assessment of the firm’s business model.
Figure 1: The analytical model (Mouritsen et al. 2003b)
Unlike an accounting system, the analysis model is 
not an input/output-model. There is no perception 
that any causal links between actions exist to develop 
employees and the effect in that area – e.g. increased 
employee satisfaction. The effect of such an ac-
tion may appear as a customer effect: The employee 
becomes more qualified and capable of serving the 
customers better. The task of the analysis is thus to 
explain these ‘many-to-many relations’ in the model. 
The classification itself does not explain the relations, 
just as increased expenses for R&D alone do not lead to 
increased turnover in the financial accounting system. 
From Bukh et al. (2005) the assessment criteria of the 
analysis model based on indicators attached to the 
three main questions of the analysis are illustrated:
Resource indicators concern the portfolio of the 
resources in the company, i.e. the stock and compo-
5sition of the company resources within the areas of 
employees, customers, processes and technologies, 
and illustrate a starting point from which action can be 
taken. The indicators deal with relatively stable units 
such as e.g. ‘a customer’, ‘an employee’, ‘a computer’, 
‘a process’ etc. They answer questions such as ‘how 
many?’ and ‘which share?’ and thus illustrate how 
big, how varied, how complex and how correlated the 
resources are. The managerial actions related to these 
resources are portfolio decisions; i.e. decisions on how 
many of the different types of knowledge resources 
the company wants. 
Activity indicators describe the company activities 
to upgrade its resources; i.e. activities initiated to 
upgrade, strengthen or develop its resource portfo-
lio. The indicators illustrate the direction in which the 
organization is working and help to answer the 
question ‘What is being done?’; e.g. what does the 
company do to develop and improve its knowledge 
resources through e.g. continuing education, invest-
ments in processes, activities to educate or attract 
customers, presentations etc. The attached manage-
ment actions are thus upgrading activities. 
Effect indicators reflect the consequences or the 
total effects of the company development and use of 
resources. As with an accounting system, the model 
only shows the effects; it does not seek to explain 
from where they arise. The analyst may seek such 
explanations on the basis of the model, but not within 
the model itself. These indicators help us to establish 
whether we are arriving where we expected to. 
Thus, when analyzing the interrelations of the busi-
ness model it is possible to apply the ideas of a 
strategic narrative. Like all other stories, this narra-
tive has a beginning, an action and an ending. So does 
the strategic narrative. It has resources, activities and 
effects. Together with an understanding of the compa-
ny strategy and the key management challenges facing 
the executive management, it is possible to mobilize 
the questions of analysis illustrated above to identify 
the key indicators of the business model. Evaluating 
the business model can therefore be done in a series 
of steps. 
A first step could be to evaluate the identified 
indicators in a scorecard-like fashion in relation to a 
set of expected targets for each indicator. Thereafter 
the indicators can be evaluated in the analysis model 
by asking which indicators affect each other. This 
analysis can be completed by asking whether some 
of the 12 boxes have missing indicators. Together 
with the indicators at hand, management should ask 
themselves how they fit into the story of what the 
company does and how it is unique. In this manner, 
management is gradually moving closer to its business 
model narrative supported by performance measures. 
In order to assess if the composition, structure and use 
of the company resources are appropriate, it is neces-
sary to consider the development of the indicators over 
time, and finally the company may pursue relative and 
absolute measures for benchmarking across time and 
across competitors.
3. THE PROCESS OF EVALUATING 
BUSINESS MODELS
While evaluating the return on investment of a new 
machine, a new product line or entering a new market 
can be difficult enough, evaluating the potential return 
of investment in a new business model is even more 
complex. Problems of understanding, evaluating and 
valuing business models derive from: 
•	 Lack of standardization, and thus comparability of 
the information
•	 Lack of time to analyze the information
•	 Lack of frames from which to analyze the informa-
tion
•	 Lack of interest in these types of information
•	 Lack of correct form on which the information is 
conveyed
Plumlee (2003) finds that the complexity of informa-
tion imposes sufficient costs even on expert users such 
as analysts and institutional investors, who, in turn, 
reduce their use of such information and this is of 
course problematic. The SC-investors do not really 
6understand information concerning business mod-
els, as it is not something taught in finance at busi-
ness schools around the world (yet), or, perhaps it is 
because they cannot be bothered learning it for them-
selves. Whether these provocative assumptions are 
correct or not, time will tell. At least we can conclude 
that business models are not a part of business school 
curriculum and definitely not a part of the existing 
institutions of the financial markets!
Transparency, here understood as the goal of commu-
nicating about your business model is not necessarily 
a question of disclosing everything possible. Rather it 
is about creating an appropriate representation of the 
company value creation. This raises two key questions:
1. What is appropriate? 
2. But what is a representation?
The logic of appropriateness as a basis for making 
decisions can be elucidated by the following question: 
“What would a person like me do in a similar situa-
tion?” Rather than calculating outcomes, a person 
is motivated by appropriate behaviour, considering 
which rules apply to a specific situation. Thus a person 
makes decisions based on his/her identity, values and 
experience, which form a set of rules-of-thumb.
Below we will describe the most important aspects 
associated with a behavioral perspective on decision-
making based on the logic of appropriateness. In 
general there are two different perspectives of fi-
nancial theory, prescriptive and descriptive. Prescrip-
tive theories are equivalent to the normative view of 
financial markets, encompassing theories such as the 
efficient markets hypothesis etc. Descriptive perspec-
tives include the behavioral approaches to finance 
theory, also known as behavioral finance. 
In essence, the disagreements between these two 
paradigms of financial theory relate to the inevitable 
discussion of whether human rationality exists per se 
or whether our cognitive abilities imply that bounded 
rationality must be the point of departure for such 
theories. This discussion leads to an account of two 
different perspectives on human action, namely human 
action as being based on ‘logic of consequentiality’ and 
human action as being based on ’logic of appropriate-
ness’. The behavioral approach to decision-making is 
concerned with, “explaining how decisions are made 
in terms of motives, cognitive processes and mental 
representations” (Ranyard et al. 1997, 3). 
Representation is essentially modeling, as it concerns 
creating images of reality. Thus images of the outside 
world are projected to us through representation (via 
e.g. some sort of ‘technology’, i.e. a business model or 
other management technology). Latour (1999) argues 
that representation becomes reality as it is a construc-
tion of objectivity. From his point of view, interaction is 
the essence of existence. Through interaction, objects 
become real only when they are able to be circulated. 
Latour argues that 3D objects cannot be circulated, 
only 2D objects can (Latour 1999). In this case repre-
sentation abbreviates complexity. Mouritsen & Dechow 
(2001, 358) emphasize this type of reasoning in 
relation to e.g. competitive advantages and 
competences, stating that these become ‘facts’ only 
if their mobilization is successful, mobilization being 
facilitated precisely through representation. 
Cooper (1992) illustrates for us that representation is 
the transformation of the object – in our case the com-
pany – into a new form that produces controllability. 
Furthermore, influenced by Zuboff (1988), he argues 
for three underlying themes of representation; these 
constitute the mechanisms by which representation 
realizes this economy of mental and physical motion:
1. Remote control
2. Displacement 
3. Abbreviation 
Through remote control, symbols and other prosthetic 
devices substitute for direct involvement of the human 
body and its senses. Remote control thus underlines 
an economy of convenience by enabling control at a 
distance. The power of representation is the ability to 
control an event remotely, and can be described as a 
form of displacement in which representation is always 
a substitution for or re-presentation of the event, and 
never the event itself. The mobility of representation, 
created through displacement, is central to control 
(and thereby also to power). 
7Displacement emerges either as a transformation 
of the object, or as conceptual or material mobility, 
e.g. via projection. Displacement denotes mobile and 
non-localizable associations, while abbreviation makes 
possible the economy of convenience that under-
lies representation. Abbreviation, inducing a subset 
of the original object, is a principle of condensation, 
which enables ease and accuracy of perception and 
action. Through abbreviation, representations are made 
compact, versatile and permutable. Behind every act of 
representation lies the urge to minimize effort, i.e. the 
economy of convenience, also denoted as the principle 
of least effort (Zipf 1949). 
When information is placed in the context of 
representation, it takes on a different meaning as 
representation is a more fundamental concept simply 
because information must first be represented in some 
way. MacKay (1969) supports this perspective in his 
definition of representation: “By representation is 
meant any structure (pattern, picture, and model) 
whether abstract or concrete, of which the features 
purport to symbolize or correspond in some sense with 
those of some other structure” (MacKay 1969, 161). 
Information is that which contributes to the efficien-
cy of a representation, thus providing advantage or 
gain. Representation and information are always pre-
occupied with the struggle for representational and 
informational gain (Cooper 1992) introducing the notion 
of decision makers, who change their representation 
of the problem in order to be able to reach a decision 
(Crozier & Ranyard 1997, 8). When perceiving business 
models as simplified versions of reality, representation 
becomes an abstraction of the business, identifying 
how that business makes money.
Let’s say that SC-investors do not understand infor-
mation on business models, which may otherwise be 
regarded as highly value relevant. Therefore, although 
they want their decisions to look consequential, they 
are in fact characterized by the logic of appropriate-
ness. Consequentiality is therefore often sought in 
some sort of quantification or scoring process, where 
the business model is evaluated and compared to other 
“business models” on an aggregated level. 
One way to improve these methodologies is to contex-
tualize information on the business model in a series of 
performance evaluation stories. Here one might think 
of representation as a story, made up of: 
1. A beginning
2. Action
3. An ending
All three elements must be present for the story 
to make sense. This business model narrative then 
becomes an abbreviation supporting the ability of 
remote control, in essence constituting a representa-
tion of the business through a description; i.e. a story 
of how it works (Magretta 2002) and the relation-
ships it is engaged in. A business model can therefore 
be thought of as a comprehensive description of the 
business system, including how the experiences of 
creating and delivering value may evolve along with the 
changing needs and preferences of customers. Such a 
narrative is an explanation of how the organization 
intends to implement its value proposition.
According to Holland (2009) the business model narra-
tive, or strategic story, normally connected many of the 
key elements in the value creation process. This was 
communicated externally to investors via a narrative 
connecting hierarchical, horizontal, and network value 
creation processes. Holland writes that “Intangibles 
that were invisible to outside monitors were connected 
via the story to more visible intangibles and tangibles 
and to output and performance measures. Track record 
was then observed (made visible) by regular checks 
of the story against reality in the form of long-term 
corporate actions (increased R&D expenditure, new 
patents, innovation) and financial performance 
(earnings, EPS, cash flow, and actual growth in these), 
consistent with the value creation story. 
The case companies argued that benchmarked 
intangibles set within the story were important 
sources of information. Some intangibles such as the 
effectiveness of R&D could be inferred from absolute 
(objective and visible) measures such as the absolute 
R&D spend, and by the number of observed innova-
tions for this expenditure. These absolute numbers 
were ranked objectively, by case companies, analysts 
and FMs (fund managers), against competitors to 
8get a comparative ranking. However, the contribution 
to value of many knowledge based competences or 
intangibles was difficult to measure. In these cases 
the key intangibles critical to a sector could be iden-
tified, and their effectiveness could be ranked on the 
basis of FMs or analysts subjective judgements, rela-
tive to competitors or the sector. Examples include the 
relative quality of top management, or the rela-
tive coherence of strategy. This relative, subjective 
benchmarking was the closest the case companies, 
analysts and FMs, came to formal or explicit ‘measure-
ment’ of many knowledge intensive competences or 
intangibles. “
This leads us to some practical implications for compa-
nies who wish to engage SC-investors (or other investor 
types for that matter) in discussing and understanding 
their business models. Firstly, focus on understand-
ing the connections and the interrelations in the busi-
ness. The core of a Business Model description is the 
connections that create value, e.g. between the box-
es by which we normally structure the management 
discussion or the organization diagram. Remember 
that endless description of customer relations, em-
ployee competences, knowledge sharing, innovation 
and risks are more or less completely uninteresting 
to an investor. However, the really interesting point is 
how these different elements interrelate, and which 
changes and fluctuations that are important to keep 
an eye on. 
How is the chosen Business Model performing can be 
assessed by analyzing the status on operations, strat-
egy and the activities we initiated in order to have a 
unique value proposition are performing. Trustwor-
thiness can be established through performance 
measures relating to the narrative. For instance, the 
business model narrative could be highlighted with 
non-financial performance measures. 
Remember, that one thing is to state that the business 
model is based on applying customer feedback in the 
innovation process, but, it is something else, and more 
valuable to explain how this is done, i.e. which activi-
ties enable this, and what are the outcomes of these 
activities. Not to mention proving the success of the 
activities through a number of performance measures 
which: 
1) Show how many resources the company is spending 
on the activity (illustrates the management focus), 
2) Illustrate the level of activity and whether the com-
pany is keeping its promises, and 
3) Show to which extent the activity has an effect, e.g. 
on customer satisfaction, R&D output etc. 
Finally, this also enables the company to follow up 
on previous statements made by management and 
as such the business model narrative introduces a 
greater and broader sense of accountability to the 
organization. This accountability can be further 
enhanced by using time-series data on the identi-
fied performance measures. This would enable the 
company to depict a story of connections and relations 
and the investor/analyst to likewise depict his/her 
own story and discuss its implications with manage-
ment. Below in figure 2, we use the analytical model to 
analyzing the business model story of a wind turbine 
manufacturer. 
9Figure 2 illustrates how the implementation of a CRM 
system in the wind turbine company leads to greater 
customer satisfaction. It also visualizes a series of key 
measurement points that could be applied in an early-
warning system on how this strategic effort is coming 
along. 
[The ideas put forth in this paper are primarily based 
on Mouritsen et al. 2003b, Nielsen 2011a and Nielsen 
2011b. For more information and consulting relating to 
analyzing strategic information such as CSR or ESG type 
information, contact XeQtive Management Advisory 
Services via www.xeqtive.com]
Figure 2: Analyzing value drivers in a business model
10
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